Since the founding of Brazil and its secession from Portugal in 1822 and especially after establishement of the republic in 1889, various groups have operated paramilitary organisations in Rio De Janeiro, known today as militias. To some, these groups are vigilante heroes, ordinary men who choose to stand against the terror of Brazil’s drug gangs and provide the security that Rio’s municipal government fails to deliver. To others, they are ruthless mafias who extort poor urban populations who have no choice but to live in informal communities under militia rule. 

However, despite their controversy, it is undeniable that militias play a crucial and ever-growing role in providing vital services such as electricity, water, transport, housing, and protection to millions of residents in Rio De Janeiro. But their open existence in Rio’s society raised a few questions: Just how did militias grow to their current power? And how do they affect the society and economy around them? 

A brief history of militias: 

The culture of paramilitary groups acting outside of government control traces back to the founding of Brazil. Wealthy Portuguese nobility that had settled around Rio De Janeiro, called Coronéis, decided to stay in Brazil and formed agreements with the central government to have jurisdiction over their land. Their detachment from official policing structures allowed them to use violence to enforce their authority and sway voters to inject themselves into official government positions. 

By the 1930s, three coronéis, known as the “Triangle Group,” emerged as a significant political force, usurping control of territories from other coronéis and forming an alliance. Around this same time, the Triangle Group took advantage of a period of widespread reforms, known as “Pereira Passos” (The Pereira steps), to gain more power. They used their influence to reconfigure electoral boundaries to manipulate local and regional elections in their favour, boundaries that are still used and exploited today by the militias operating within Rio. 

The influence of the Triangle Group declined greatly over the following decades, but their violent example of extralegal authority, bribery, and political control was not forgotten. Building on the example of the Triangle Group, the template of the modern-day militia came about in the 1960s. Brazil’s rapid industrialisation had attracted large numbers of agricultural labourers to major cities, leading to a scarcity of labour in the agricultural sector and a huge influx of new citizens to Rio’s most deprived areas. The agricultural sector could not keep up with demand with its reduced labour capital, so food shortages in large cities like Rio became common. 

As the people began to riot, ex-military officers and off-duty policemen were hired by businesses for protection and to re-establish social order. Since these groups were led by those with ties to the police, they focused on maintaining order in the informal communities and vehemently opposed the existence of drug gangs and the distribution of drugs. This policy was a central tenet of the militias, and has remained a strong belief of militia groups to this day. The legacy of that policy is one of the reasons why militias are so tolerated and successful today. Their conflict with gangs such as the Red Command serves as effective public relations, strengthens their control over a favela, and discourages infighting between officers through providing a common enemy. 

However, their role in preventing the proliferation of drugs should not serve to obfuscate the atrocities that militias committed as they grew in power. As they deepened their control of informal communities, violence grew. Many were persecuted as “bandits” and killed as an example to remind people of the militias’ power. By the 1980s, sociologist José Claudio Alves estimates that in Baixa Fluminence – one of the worst-affected regions in Rio – over 3000 people were being killed by militias every year. 

Baixa Fluminense’s problems did not, unfortunately, end there. Between 1950 and 2000, its population of 400,000 had grown by 688% to just under 3 million due to a large influx of workers from the north of Brazil. Baixa Fluminense’s already failing social services and housing market were placed under enormous strain, especially following harsh cuts to government spending in the area. Many turned to building their own informal, unregistered housing, known in Rio as “favelas” that had no water supplies, plumbing systems, electricity, or insurance since they were not built with city planning. 

Militias seized this opportunity to use their political connections, bribery, and intimidation tactics to secure permission from the regional government to build their official housing developments. In many cases, militias would bribe notaries to falsify documents verifying government registration, so new tenants had no way to know they were illegal. 

In the present day, militias have taken on roles as a kind of service provider for the informal communities spread across Rio de Janeiro. A far cry from their original role as peacekeepers, militias broker agreements to bring power, water transport services, and more to many deprived communities at a marked-up price. Militias have also made their way into mainstream politics. Where they used to back candidates from the shadows by funding campaigns and coercing voters, militias have started putting forward their candidates to achieve more direct political control. 

Even despite some of these candidates having blatant ties to militias, their existence has become so normalised and entrenched in Rio’s culture that political candidates remain viable even after militia ties are revealed. The most spectacular example of this is ex-president Jaír Bolsonaro. His family publicly supported militias and even had documented links to their activities. Still, he managed to rise to the pinnacle of political power in Brazil, using his power to further the militias’ goals by dismantling gun laws and allowing citizens to own up to 60 guns for “sport shooting”. 

The impact of militias on Rio De Janeiro’s economy. 

The State of Rio de Janeiro, according to 2019 statistics, accounts for 5.7 million jobs (6% of all jobs across Brazil). However, it is estimated that the informal economy and employment sector in Rio may account for another 2.8 million jobs, many of which are only made possible due to the existence of militias. Informal stores, corner shops, and businesses that exist unregistered in areas of militia control can only exist with militia protection. In addition, militias regularly employ architects, structural engineers, builders, and manual labourers in their housing developments, creating even more jobs in the informal sector. 

It is no coincidence, therefore, that Rio experiences the greatest proportion of illegal employment to legal employment out of any other urban area in Brazil. Compared to the average proportion of 1 in 4 jobs existing in the informal economy in other cities, 1 in 3 jobs in Rio de Janeiro exist in the informal sector. 

The lost tax revenue from this 1/3rd of jobs, which go unregistered and unaccounted for in Rio alone, amounts to a huge loss for Brazil’s government. Using a conservative estimate of the mean wage in the informal economy being 50% of the national minimum wage – only BRL 706 or 114 USD per month – the total wages paid out in Rio’s informal economy would be 24 billion BRL (4 billion USD). Even this conservative estimate reveals a massive amount of untaxed income, yet true figures may be much higher, as polling statistics show that 57% of men and 42% of women working in the informal economy earn more than the monthly minimum wage. 

Whilst the militias’ involvement in enabling informal employment may be detrimental to the health of Rio’s economy, workers unable to find employment in the formal economy benefit from it. Although their jobs are uninsured and carry few benefits, it at least allows these workers to earn wages whilst they search for alternative employment in the formal sector. 

However, not all of the militias’ activities are so contrary to the government’s priorities. In Rio’s housing development market, militias work as a useful legal loophole that allows the state government to more easily sell and develop its less favourable land. 

Areas that are prone to flooding, have marshy or silty soil, or are legally protected can be impossible for the government to sell due to legal barriers or investors’ unwillingness to develop subpar land. So, the government, in tacit agreement with militias, turns a blind eye when militias “illegally” occupy these plots, leading to the creation of “loteamentos clandestinos” (clandestine subdivisions). The militias then develop this land into apartment buildings and neighbourhoods for the urban poor without the government having to spend a dime. Once the projects are complete, the government uses legislation aimed at legalising these developments to bring them under government oversight and registration. 

This symbiotic relationship between militia and government benefits each party equally: The militias get to rent out their newly legalised housing development in a market where affordable housing is hugely scarce, and the government gets help solving their housing crisis at zero cost. 

The urban poor residents of Rio also benefit from an increase in living standards after moving from informal housing to these new developments. The housing developments are especially important for the poorest residents due to the inadequacy of Brazil’s affordable housing projects to provide for them. Brazil’s most prominent affordable housing project, “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” (My House, My Life), which provides up to 90% subsidised housing, entirely suppressed initiatives for the lowest income group following a hefty 2016 budget cut. Since then, the developments sponsored by militias have become one of the few options available to the lowest-income citizens. 

Using data from the Rio de Janeiro City Secretariat of Urbanism, which published data on the number of newly legalised developments across Rio, over 8000 developments were legalised across the state of Rio from 2009-2020. The distribution of these legalised developments correlates almost perfectly with the distribution of militias, leading some institutions such as the Observitório das Metrópoles to estimate that militias are responsible for over 25% of these projects. 

The militias’ massive investments in this sector speak to the profitability of supplying the low-income housing market. Due to the scale and growth of this new sector for militias, some sociologists suspect that this may represent a fundamental shift in the business model of militias. Throughout almost their entire history, militias received the majority of their income through protection rackets, as they began in the food riots of the 1960s. However, with how successful militias have become at dominating real estate in Rio De Janeiro, this tried and tested formula may come under threat. 

For the average resident living under militia control the militias’ shift away from violent protection rackets and towards semi-legal real estate development represents a positive change. It the market continues to favour new real estate development, more militias will follow suit and hopefully affect the people around them in a more positive way.